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Andrews, Mark (N. Dakota)

4/2/81

- "The fall of the shah should have taught us the danger of selling the latest American technology to unstable regimes."

- "The security of the United States is the primary interest of the United States, and I am therefore opposed to the sale of the latest armaments and the most sophisticated aircraft in our arsenal to Saudi Arabia."

- "There is just too great a change of the systems' secrets being compromised by defection, accident, diversion on technological manuals or Soviet intelligence activities."

Armstrong, William L. (Colorado)

4/2/81

- No specific objection.

- Expresses hope "that the Administration will meet with Senators and others who have raised these issues and take steps necessary, in negotiations with the Saudi or otherwise, to allay these concerns."

Baucus, Max (Montana)

4/2/81

- "I am concerned about the wisdom, timing and scope of the Administration's proposal."

- "We should not be blinded by our Nation's need for a stable supply of Saudi oil."

Biden, Joseph R. (Delaware)

4/2/81

- The Administration's "decision repudiates assurances previously given to the Congress and needlessly and dangerously increases the level of armaments in the volatile Middle East."

- "If these sales are to be in our own national interest, we should receive some tangible benefits—but none have even been promised."

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Boschwitz, Rudy (Minnesota)

3/24/81

- In "opposition to the enhancement package that is being suggested for the Saudis."

- The list of military equipment sold by our country (to Saudi Arabia) on a perhaps litmus test basis, as this sale is now being heralded, is indeed long."

-..."to sell an enhancement package of equipment, some of which is not yet deployed even on our own aircraft does not lend itself to the stability, to the continuance of peace in the Middle East."

4/2/81

- (quotes from several Saudi newspapers)

- "It is indeed sad that by hoping to arm these countries for the purpose of sharing stability in the area that indeed we may be accomplishing the opposite end."

Bradley, Bill (New Jersey)

3/24/81

"President Reagan's military potion of fuel tanks and smart missiles is no cure for Middle East maladies."

- "We should tell the Saudis "we cannot sell (the enhancement equipment) "because to do so would endanger a longtime U.S. ally, and the United States will always protect the interest of all its allies."

- "The Administration's contention that the sale of equipment is necessary to regional stability, defend Saudi Arabia and restore U.S. credibility with our Saudi ally does not hold water."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

Burdick, Quentin N. (N. Dakota)

3/24/81

- "This sale does not serve American purposes or advance American interests."

- "The sale calls into question the commitments of the U.S. government" (made three years ago in the previous F-15 sale)

- "Even if the Soviets should move toward the Gulf, it is U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean which would beat the burden of stopping such aggression."

- "There is no available evidence that this sale or any other sales will have the effect of insuring American oil supplies."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

Chafee, John (Rhode Island)

4/2/81

- Mentions his support of 1978 sale, "not an easy decision."

- "To say yes for the sale or no against it, without knowing precisely what will be proposed, seems to me to be premature, unless we simply wish to redebate the issues of the original sale in 1978."

- Cites two major factors which will influence his thinking."

"..how this sale affects our ability to carry forward our policies in the Persian Gulf area."

"what affect such a sale would have on Israel's security."

Chiles, Lawton (Florida)

3/24/81

- Cites opposition to 1978 sale.

- "..we want to be able to provide the Saudis with the capability of defending themselves and defending the strategic oil that they have in that region, but to go further than that and to introduce now with this package of armaments that we are talking about now a highly offensive place concerns me."

Cohen, William (Maine)

3/24/81

- "We must proceed with caution."

- "In my view, the case for the sale of the offensive weapons is not yet clear or convincing."

-.."attention should focus on whether the interests of the Saudis, and of our Nation, might not be better served by a different mix of weaponry."

Cranston, Alan (California)

4/2/81

..."firmly opposed to the decision of the Reagan administration".

.."sale would increase Israel's insecurity and would fuel another round of the destabilizing arms race in the Middle East."

- "There is no concrete evidence that in exchange for receiving this equipment the Saudis will support efforts to build a lasting peace in the Middle East..."

D'Amato, Alfonse (New York)

3/24/81

...asks "to consider whether or not an arms sale to Saudi Arabia really serves our national interest."

- "We must also consider the security of our military technology. We must consider the possibility that our technology might fall into unfriendly hands."

- "The proposed sale is not in our best interests and will only fuel the tension that already exists in the Middle East."

- "In short, this sale does nothing to advance the cause for political or military stability in the Middle East."

Danforth, John C. (Missouri)

4/2/81

...expresses "strong opposition." I do not believe this action would be in the interests of the United States, Israel, or, for that matter, Saudi Arabia."

- "The sale of this equipment runs directly counter to commitments made by our Government to the people of Israel."

- "The sale certainly will not strengthen the Arab-Israeli peace process."

- "Finally, I question whether the sale of the F-15 attachments would really be in the best interest of the Saudis."

DeConcini, Dennis (Arizona)

3/24/81

- "It is my firm belief that the Administration's decision...may ultimately prove detrimental not only to the security of Israel, but to the general stability of the Middle East."

- "...upgrading of the F-15 will, at best, have a short term effect on the Saudi's attitude toward the United States."

- "...the United States is stimulating the arms race in the Middle East by making this sale..."

- "The Saudis accepted (the limitation pledged by the Carter administration) as a condition of the sale, and I do not believe that the Senate would have approved the sale without this assurance."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Dixon, Alan (Illinois)

3/25/81

- "I believe that the President's proposal suffers from several concrete shortcomings, and foremost among them is the failure to extract specific assurance from Saudi Arabia about the security of the State of Israel."

- "I am not convinced the present proposal lays the proper groundwork for further stabilization in the Middle East, for continued security for the State of Israel, or for protection of the vital interests of the United States."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

4/2/81

- "I urge President Reagan fully to consider the ramifications of such a sale, and I ask my colleagues to contemplate most carefully any proposal brought to us that pertains to arming the Saudis with AWACS."

Dole, Robert (Kansas)

3/24/81

- opposed sale in 1978, and has "serious concerns" about proposed F-15 sale.

- "What are the prospects of any gain to America or the West by making this addition to the Saudi arsenal?"

- "Is there any indication that Saudi policy will be any less threatening to U.S. interests if we follow through on our plan on the strategic petroleum reserve?"

- "Is there any prospect that the sales of this weaponry to the Riyadh regime will lead to Saudi participation in the peace negotiations?"

- "I say that a number of us who certainly want to support this Administration are going to have to have some indication, somebody to give us some assurance on behalf of the Saudis that there will be certain - maybe "concessions" is not the right word, but certain considerations by Saudi Arabia."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

Durenberger, David (Minnesota)

3/24/81

- "In terms of the pending request for offensive weaponry for Saudi Arabian F-15 aircraft, I am not convinced of the wisdom of granting such a request."

- "While it might be possible to offset the effects of such a sale with other measures, I must wait until such other measures have been discussed."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

Eagleton, Thomas (Missouri)

3/24/81

- "to modify now the Saudi F-15's so as to give them an offensive capability would be a direct violation of that (1978) understanding."

- "reluctantly supported sale of the planes only after receiving assurances from the Administration that no attempt would be made to increase the range of ground attack capability."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Ford, Wendell (Kentucky)

4/2/81

- "...issues words of caution against sale" and says the Administration "should think twice about sending the proposal (F-15's) to the Congress."

- "Not only would this proposed sale engender an arms race, it would destabilize the Middle East."

- "...the United States may be beginning to make the same mistake it made by overloading Iran with sophisticated weapons systems, only to see them fall into the hands of a fanatical government."

- "The implications of this proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia are far reaching and any pluses it might bring are far outweighed by its minuses."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

Goldwater, Barry (Arizona)

3/24/81

- "I am in favor of selling Saudi Arabia F-15's."

- "I believe we made the right decision to sell them these airplanes and thereby cementing our friendship a little more. I think in the long run, it will prove beneficial to Israel, rather than detrimental."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Gorton, Slade (Washington)

- Discusses strain on Israeli economy if in response to this sale it requires increased commitment to national security functions."

- Suggests we reconsider sales, "until better assurances are received that will actually result in a stronger and more open support for our peace efforts..."

- "I am not yet persuaded that the security of Saudi Arabia's oil installation will be increased by the addition of F-15 fighters with sophisticated equipment..."

- "Until (favorable) leadership is shown, why should we encourage present trends by making concessions without return?"

Hart, Gary (Colorado)

3/24/81

- "I oppose the Administration's proposal to enhance the power and range of the F-15 fighter planes sold to Saudi Arabia in 1978 because I do not feel the proposed arms sales advances the interests of the United States in the Middle East."

- "The arms sale would significantly increase the military threat to Israel and thus jeopardize the military balance in the Middle East."

- "would further burden Israel's economy with even greater requirements for arms."

- "The sales would not enhance the security of Saudi Arabia, a nation increasingly threatened by internal instability."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

Hatch, Orrin (Utah)

4/2/81

- "Sale ... may seriously endanger American interests in the Middle East for several reasons."

- Cites "U.S. going back on a promise;" "A threat to Israel's national security," "the question of Saudi internal stability," and "gestures of good will between the two countries (U.S. and Saudi Arabia) have for the most part, been unilateral."

- "Therefore, at this time, I lean against this sale and unless someone can show me ample reason to change, I will probably vote against it."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Hawkins, Paula (Florida)

4/2/81

- "I must express my grave concern about the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia."

- "... Saudi AWACS could detect even a speeding car anywhere in Israel while still flying within their own borders."

- "If we must sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis should be willing to recognize the legitimacy and sovereignty of Israel."

Heflin, Howell (Alabama)

4/2/81

- "As I see it, these sales cannot be justified in terms of the legitimate defense needs of Saudi Arabia." "... the Saudi Arabians cannot defend themselves from any credible threat, no matter how much equipment we provide them."

- Expresses concern for impact on Israel.

- "I simply fail to understand how the present package of military sales to the Middle East can help Saudi Arabian, Israeli or ultimately U.S. security."

Heinz, Roger (Iowa)

4/2/81

- "Shows there are "compelling reasons for standing in direct opposition to this sale."

- "There is no valid argument to be made for the sale of this advanced equipment for the Saudi F-15's. Any possible improvements in our relations with the Saudis are uncertain at best. The potential damage to U.S. foreign policy is certainly more concrete and more far reaching."

- "We must not abandon our lifelong ally, Israel, for the sake of an expedient short term supposedly self-interest gain."

Kasten, Robert (Wisconsin)

3/24/81

- ... important that we "not act in haste, but that we do act with prudence and foresight."

- Says over two years have passed since the 1978 sale and "we have seen little from the Saudi Government to back up their previous assurances."

Kennedy, Edward (Massachusetts)

2/19/81

- "Strongly opposed" to proposed plans "to enhance F-15 fighter planes supplied to Saudi Arabia."

- "Saudi Arabia steadfastly refuses to recognize the existence of Israel or to support peace negotiations between Israel and her neighbors."

- "Instead of making Saudi Arabia a greater military threat to Israel, we should be seeking a Saudi Arabia that is a force for peace between Israel and the nations of the Middle East."

4/2/81

- "I pledge absolutely to oppose the AWACS plane sales to Saudi Arabia."

Levin, Carl (Michigan)

3/24/81

- "The proposed sale of offensive equipment for the F-15's for Saudi Arabia is wrong."

- "As one who has returned just three months ago from a tour of the region, I say that the threat the Saudis face - and they do face a threat - will not be deterred or countered by this equipment."

- "Failure to approve this sale might have a slight impact on our relationship with Saudi Arabia, granted. But it will not be devastating."

- "It will, however, be devastating if we approve that sale in several specific ways."

- "... it will do the region a great deal of harm."

Mathias, Charles (Maryland)

3/24/81

- "If any changes are to be made in the commitments, (from 1978), they must be made with the agreement of all the parties concerned, the whole package—the Congress, the executive branch, the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Saudis."

- "For all parties to agree, then Israel's defense against an enhanced Saudi threat must be strengthened."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Matsunaga, Spark (Hawaii)

4/2/81

- expresses "grave concern" over the intention to sell equipment which would enhance the offensive capability of the F-15 aircraft.

- "The decision to sell warplane equipment to Saudi Arabia lacks any sound military rationale, and would only result in an increased military threat for Israel and an increase of arms escalation in the Middle East."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Metzenbaum, Howard (Ohio)

4/2/81

- "This is a bad decision..."

- "It is a decision that works directly against the basic interests of the U.S. It threatens the security of Israel. And it does nothing whatever to enhance the stability of the Saudi Arabian monarch."

- "The Administration will not keep the promises of the previous Administration."

Mitchell, George (Maine)

3/24/81

- expresses "concern" about proposed sale.

- "A careful assessment of the military and diplomatic situation in the Middle East at present reveals no compelling evidence that this sale of offensive equipment is warranted by Saudi defense needs."

- "I recognize and share the Administration's desire to assure international stability and order."

- "Under the circumstances, I hope the Administration will reconsider and not ask that this equipment be approved for sale."

- (Does not mention AWACS.)

4/30/81

- "The decision to go ahead with this sale (F-15's and AWACS) simply repeats the unworkable policy of using American arms to establish stability in the Middle East."

- "Saudi Arabia faces no threat to which the AWAC's represents a credible deterrent or a useful counter."

Moynihan, Daniel (New York)

3/24/81

- "Has Saudi Arabia declared its intention to destroy the State of Israel? I say to the Senator that it has."

- "If the Saudis would associate themselves with the quest for a consensus in the Middle East, if they associated themselves with Egypt's desire for peace, if they would associate themselves with Israel's legitimate right to exist, then we would move as we are doing with some confidence."

- "Let us not tell a power that has declared its intent to destroy the democratic State of Israel that we do not object."

Packwood, Bob (Oregon)

3/24/81

- "I think before we enter into this agreement with Saudi Arabia it is wise to look back over what we have already agreed to do, what we hoped we would receive in exchange for what we have agreed to do, and what has happened."

- "With the background of having done almost everything to destabilize peace in the Middle East since 1978, the Saudi Arabians come back and ask for what they said they did not want to ask for in 1978 and we are prepared to sell them what we said we would not sell them in 1978."

- "My standard as to whether or not we should sell planes to Saudi Arabia is not whether they think they need them for their defense. It is, "have they given any indication of wanting to help the peace process in the Middle East?"

Pell, Claiborne (Rhode Island) - See page 16.

Pressler, Larry (S. Dakota)

3/24/81

- Says "very firmly" that "I oppose this sale and I oppose the sale of the related parts."

- "... it has been my feeling that Saudi Arabia could very easily be another Iran."

- "I have consistently opposed sending into the Middle East weapons of this type."

- "... I think that if we were to go into such a sale, we should have certain commitments from Saudi Arabia as to when the planes would come off the ground, and, indeed, if our country were challenged in that area of the world, would they be willing to assist us."

Proxmire, William (Wisconsin)

3/26/81

- Sale of F-15's poses a threat to both Israel and Saudi Arabia.

- "And what comes next? Is the AWACS the next military vehicle to be sold to the Saudis?... An AWACS would be the ideal battle control system for the Saudi to use to detect, intercept, and destroy Israeli aircraft over the entire region."

- "Clearly it is not in the interest of the United States to complete this sale. The end result will be a less stable Middle East, an increase of tension and an inevitable widening of any potential war."

Quayle, Dan (Indiana)

4/2/81

- "I have reservations as to whether a case for the sale of such weaponry can be convincingly made."

- Outlines concerns and questions "which should be raised and answered as we approach the decisionmaking process which affect two nations—both of whom are our friends and vital to our own security."

Riegle, Don (Michigan)

4/2/81

- Joins in "speaking today in opposition to the Saudi request..."

- Voted against sale in 1978. Says, "Today, my conviction in this regard and my opposition are even stronger."

- "... the Saudis have done nothing to encourage a peace settlement in the Middle East."

- "I intend to work against - and vote against - further offensive weapons arms shipments to Saudi Arabia."

- (Does not discuss AWACS.)

Roth, William (Delaware)

4/2/81

- Raises "serious questions as to the wisdom of providing Saudi Arabia with the very latest in American electronics warfare equipment. I would have thought our experience in Iran would have taught us this lesson."

- "I have even graver doubts concerning the proposal sale of the AWACS system. This is not just an early warning system. It is an entire command and control center, that, when wedded to 60 F-15's, would present Israel with a very serious security problem."

- "I urge the President not to approve this sale."

Sarbanes, Paul (Maryland)

4/2/81

- "To proceed with the sale would only compound the error made in agreeing three years ago to the sale of the F-15 planes themselves."

- "There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the Saudis look more favorably on the peace treaty today than they did three years ago."

Sasser, Jim (Tennessee)

4/2/81

- Expresses opposition to the "sale of auxiliary equipment for the F-15's previously sold to Saudi Arabia."

- "I think we have to view, with justifiable caution, any impulse to relegate this much influence and this much technological authority to a third party."

- "It is not in our interest or the interest of any country in the region to allow this sale to go through."

Specter, Arlen (Pennsylvania)

3/24/81

- "... express my personal reservations on having the United States supply such equipment (to Saudi Arabia)."

- "In my view, there is a heavy burden of persuasion on those who would now seek to supply such equipment."

- "It may be that commitments by Saudi Arabia, backed by corroborating deeds, could satisfy these concerns."

Stevens, Ted (Alaska)

4/2/81

- "It is a matter which I think requires deep, in depth analysis of its impact upon the stability of the Middle East and in particular upon the attitudes that have been expressed by Saudi Arabians concerning other nations in that area."

- "It appears to me that there is no question that there should be some movement on the part of the Saudi Arabians if we are to change the policy that was initiated at the time we made the original agreement to sell the F-15's to Saudi Arabia."

Tower, John (Texas)

3/24/81

- "I believe that I must advocate those positions which are designed to preserve and protect the national interest of the United States of America."

- "In my view, we minimize the threat to Israel when the Gulf states arm and defend themselves by providing them with our equipment which requires our spare parts, our technical assistance, and our supply train."

- "In the final analysis we cannot talk of the threat in 1978 terms. We have to think of it in 1981 terms, and the dimensions there have changed dramatically."

Tsongas, Paul (Massachusetts)

4/2/81

- "I have tried to approach the issue of arms sales to Saudi Arabia with an open mind."

- "The Saudis will acquire a significant improvement in the offensive and defensive capability of their air force. I cannot simply brush aside these cold military realities as I evaluate this issue."

- "It must be clear to the President and his Cabinet that our commitment to Israel cannot be compromised."

Weicker, Lowell (Connecticut)

4/2/81

- "Should the Reagan Administration persist in its intention to sell the Saudis equipment to increase the range or ground attack capability of their F-15 aircraft, I will support a resolution of disapproval on this floor."

- "The tragic experience of this Nation's relationship with Iran should raise compelling questions."

- "There should be no illusions, that such a move can be made without undermining the security of Israel."

- "Unfortunately, we probably have too much oil on our glasses to see this clearly."

Pell, Claiborne (Rhode Island)

4/2/81

- "The Administration's plan to sell equipment to Saudi Arabia to enhance the attack capability of the Saudi F-15 force is ill conceived, ill planned, and I hope, ill fated."

- "Then (1978), as now, I have felt that we should avoid, whenever possible, adding to the arms race in the steaming cauldron that is the Middle East."

- "Enhancement would not be a decisive factor in a conflict with the Soviet Union."

- "An escalation in armaments to the region would be both shortsighted and counterproductive, and directly counter to the interests of both Israel and Saudi Arabia."

- "If the Administration pursues this sale, I intend to join with others of my colleagues in introducing a resolution of disapproval and in giving this matter thorough scrutiny in the Committee on Foreign Relations."